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Citizenship and individuation in
Turkey: the triumph of will over
reason
Ayse KADIOGLU
1 Enlightenment  is  man's  emergence  from  his  self-incurred  immaturity.  Immaturity  is  the
inability  to  use  one's  own  understanding  without  the  guidance  of  another.  This
immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution
and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of Enlightenment is
therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own  understanding!
2 Immanuel Kant
1
3 In a short essay that I wrote in 1996, I had argued that the limitations of the feminist
arguments in Turkey basically stem from an assumption that women are citizens prior to
being individuals
2
. Feminist demands in Turkey are usually posed by way of attachment
to grand social  and political  projects  such as  Kemalism,  Socialism as  well  as  Islamic
identities
3
.  Kemalist  feminists  emphasize  women's  public  visibility  in  modern  attires
especially in the political arena, such as their presence and visibility in the parliament
and within the political party structures.  Socialist women, in the course of the 1970s
emphasized a view of equality of women which came to mean "similarity with men".
Hence, they denounced their sexuality and feminity and posed as "sisters" of socialist
men
4
. Islamic women, on the other hand, have been staging a fight of the costumes since
the early 1980s. With the advent of political Islam, the covered bodies of the Moslem
women are  perpetuated  in  stark  contrast  with  the  bodies  of  modern women.  These
women resort to veiling in order to emphasize their personality rather than sexuality
5
.
Veiling has become a way of denouncing sexuality outside of the confines of a marital
arrangement.  In the course of  serving such grand social  and political  projects,  then,
Turkish women have subordinated their individual identities. The trajectory of Turkish
men is not too different from that of Turkish women in terms of the subordination of
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individuality. Hence, Turkish men and women, first and foremost perceive themselves
first and foremost as Turkish citizens who have the responsibility of performing certain
duties. 
4 In the course of the past couple of years, there has been an increase in academic efforts in
the West to critically examine and perhaps redefine the notion of modern citizenship.
Feminist literature contributed a great deal to academic discussions on the notion of
citizenship. Today, the notion of modern citizenship is in the process of getting divorced
from  its  attachment  to  the  nation-state.  In  other  words,  we  live  in  an  era  in  which
increasing  demands  here  are  to  open  up  the  public  realm to  differences  that  were
previously relegated into the private realm. These demands for opening up the public
realm to differences involve women, immigrants, blacks, as well as ethnic and religious
groups.
5 In this article I will first present a brief review of the existing literature that classifies and
critically discusses the modern notion of citizenship,  keeping a particular eye on the
Turkish notion of citizenship. The main thesis of this article is that "the citizen precedes
the individual" in Turkey. In other words, as it is expressed in the title, "will triumphed
over reason" in the Turkish context. Secondly,  the article attempts at portraying the
validity  of  this  thesis  by referring to the works of  a  self-proclaimed Turkish liberal,
Ahmet Agaoglu, who elaborated on the concept of the individual in Turkey in the 1930s.
6 The notions of citizenship and individualism can be studied in various ways. One could
study  Constitutions  and  other  legal  documents,  such  as  property  laws  in  order  to
delineate the category of citizenship in a particular context. One could also study certain
critical texts written by philosophers, political thinkers or founders of a political regime,
that focus on the "concepts" of citizenship and individualism. The following discussion
approaches the notions of citizenship and individualism from the latter angle. 
7 The roots of the modern concept of citizenship can be located in the French Revolution. It
evolved along with the evolution of various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of
the  French  Revolution.  The  beginnings  of  immigration  control  in  Europe  were  an
outcome of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a
direct  response  to  the  flight  of  French  refugees  (about  eight  thousand)  from  the
Revolution
6
. In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to
the  French  Revolution  and  fears  that  Jacobin  emissaries  had  infiltrated  immigrant
groups. 
8  The modern concept of citizen is closely associated with the movement from rural areas
to  urban  centers.  A  citizen  is  someone  from the  civitas (city).  In  the  course  of  the
eighteenth century, the city was a place where individual freedoms were pushed to the
forefront and feudal hierarchical structures were destroyed. Citizenship was the motor of
these  changes  away  from  feudal  bondage  relations  towards  capitalist contractual
relations. The nineteenth century, on the contrary, was characterized by many romantic
views of the city as the center of decadence and deterioration. 
9  Today, with the increasing scrutiny of the basic categories of modernity, the modern
notion of citizenship has begun to be viewed outside of its attachment to the nation-state.
The current need to revise the category of citizenship is a consequence of the process of
globalization. Globalization and the transfer of images and populations across countries
has  prompted  the  opening  up  of  the  public  realm  to  differences  that  were  earlier
relegated  to  the  private  realm.  Such  differences  are  usually  expressed  in  terms  of
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discourses pertaining to gender, race, religion, and ethnicity. At the advent of the twenty
first century, the notion of citizenship is going through a transformation along with other
conceptual searches within democratic theory. The decline of the supremacy of nation
states has captured the attention of many researchers, who emphasizes the increasing
importance  of  regional  cooperation  as  well  as  globalization.  However,  Europe  has
simultaneously been witnessing a remarkable resurgence of nationalism as well. Hence,
our times are characterized by conflicting trends which signal the demise of the nation-
state  as  well  as  the  resurgence  of  nationalisms.  Perhaps,  one  of  the  distinguishing
features of our times is a conflict duality involving the lowering of established barriers to
communication among the peoples of the world and, at the same time, the erection of
new ones.  Hence,  while  some  of  the  historical  reasons  that  have  paved  the  way  to
nationalism and xenophobia in the European context are being eliminated, new ones are
mushrooming  in  political  cultures  laden  with  racial  motifs
7
.  The  debates  regarding
citizenship  are  also  revolving  around  similar  themes.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are
arguments regarding the dissolution of the modern concept of citizenships along with the
nation state, and its replacement by the larger category of human rights and, on the
other,  there  are  yearnings  for  pre-modern,  organic  communities  as  the  basis  of
citizenship, along with authoritarian nationalisms. Hence, while the modern notion of
citizenship is widening into human rights, it is, at the same time, getting narrower, with
the increasing salience of identity politics, and with an urge to glorify private identities.
Thus,  a  revision  and  redefinition  of  the  modern  notion  of  citizenship  involves  a
"rearticulation of the public and private realms" that were separated in modernity and
were fused in pre-modern societies
8
.
10 In the Turkish context, the urge to revise and redefine the notion of citizenship as arisen
from a visible accentuation of the expression of women's as well as Islamic and Kurdish
identities, since the late 1980s. Such differences which were previosuly relegated into the
private  real,  begun  to  make  their  presence  felt  in  the  public  realm.  The  absolute,
homogeneous,  all-encompassing category of  Turkish citizenship has been demystified
and has begun to crumble due to the predominance of an "identity politics" in Turkey,
based  on  gender-related,  religious  and  ethnic  identities.  While  this  issue  has  been
attracting  increasing  attention  in  academic  circles
9
,  a  new  notion  referred  as
"Constitutional citizenship" has begun to be discussed in the political circles with the
expression even being used by the President, Süleyman Demirel
10
. In the midst of these
debates on Turkish citizenship, some people have begun to say of themselves "I am from
Turkey"(Türkiye'liyim),  rather  than  "I  am  a  Turk"  (Türküm).  This  symbolized  the
demystification of the official view of Turkish citizenship embodied in Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk's famous expression "How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk!" (Ne mutlu
Türküm  diyene!).  I  believe  that  the  issue  of  citizenship  poses  the  question  of
democratization in Turkey from the angle of  modernity rather than focusing on the
specific features and problems of the Turkish modernization project. The scrutiny of the
modern notion of citizenship is not peculiar to Turkey. It is a process that was unleashed
all over the world as a result of a dynamics set in play by globalization.
11 Almost all the new analyses of the modern notion of citizenship in the literature refer to
T.  H.  Marshall's  classical  works
11
.  Marshall  refers to three dimensions of citizenship :
civil/legal, political, and social. Firstly civil/legal rights of citizens evolved in the course
of  the  seventeenth  century  vis  a  vis  the  absolutist  states.  Accordingly,  courts  and
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individual legal rights began to appear. Secondly, political rights evolved in the course of
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  alongside  the  evolution  of  modern
parliamentary systems. Thirdly, the social dimension of citizenship is a phenomenon of
the twentieth century and is related to the welfare state. This dimension had paved the
way to certain social rights of individuals, such as unemployment, health, and education.
Marshall, then, pointed to a uniform, evolutionary and teleological history of the notion
of citizenship. As a result, his citizenship theory has been criticized extensively in the
recent literature for failing to account for various types of modern citizenship
12
. 
12 Still, the sequence in the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship can be utilized
in  accounting  for  different  trajectories  towards  modern  citizenship.  In  cases  where
democratization  preceded  bureaucratization,  civil  and  legal  rights  have  acquired
predominance, to the detriment of social rights. In the United States, for instance, the
notion of  "social  citizenship" is  an oxymoron
13
.  Citizens relate to the state either via
contractual  arrangements  or  they receive  aid  from the state  in  the  form of  charity.
Hence, the recipients of welfare, state benefits are usually viewed as lazy parasites who
are unworthy of the honor of citizenship. Quite contrarily, in Germany, and most other
Western European countries where bureaucratization preceded democratization, citizens
(the members of the Volk) benefit from welfare state provisions as "rights". In Turkey, the
distinguishing feature of civil, legal, political and social rights is the fact that they were
given  from above,  rather  than  acquired  as  rights  in  the  aftermath  of  demands  and
struggles from below. Hence, citizenship was given from above prior to the birth of a
bourgeoisie  which  posed  demands  and  ignited  the  fire  that  culminated  in
constitutionalism
14
.
13 In what follows, three major classifications of the modern notion of citizenship that have
appeared in the recent literature will be reviewed, while keeping an eye on the trajectory
of Turkish citizenship.
14 The years between 1789 and 1815 signaled the emergence of both French and German
nationalisms
15
.  German  nationalism  emerged  alongside  a  cultural  movement,  i.e.
Romanticism. One of the most distinguishing features of this tradition was its critical
attitude  towards  French  cosmopolitanism.  German  Romantics  thought  that  the
rationalism  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  artificial.  They  relied  on  intuitions  and
emotions rather than reason and intellect. The German Romantic movement revealed the
dark and anti-rational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a German nation that
evolved in the course of the nineteenth century stemmed from a Volkisch ideology which
later  formed  the  basis  of  the  National  Socialist  worldview.  The  German  Romantic
literature  became  the  medium  for  the  expression  of  German  nationalism  in  the
nineteenth  century,  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  German nation-state.  Since  German
nationalism preceded the nation-state,  it  was expressed in ethnic and cultural terms.
Accordingly,  William  Rogers  Brubaker  refers  to  an  "ethnocultural  conception  of
nationhood"  in  Germany
16
.  In  comparing  the  German  and  French  conceptions  of
nationhood and citizenship, Brubaker says :
15 It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make
all  Utopiphones citizens of  Utopia.  Crudely put,  the former represents the French,  the latter the
German  model  of  nationhood.  Whether  juridical  (as  in  naturalization)  or  cultural,  assimilation
presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief, which France took over from the
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Roman tradition, that the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants -or immigrant workers- into
Frenchmen
17
.
16 Hence, while the French conception of citizenship evolved in an assimilationist and state-
centered  manner,  the  German  conception  acquired  an  organic,  differentialist,
dissimilationist  and  Volk-centered  character.  French  nationhood  evolved  in  a
predominantly political way, while the German one became predominantly ethnocultural.
As Brubaker puts it :
17 In fact,  traditions of nationhood have political and cultural components in both countries. These
components have been closely integrated in France, where political unity has been understood as
constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition, in contrast, political
and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another, serving as the basis
for competing conceptions of  nationhood.  One such conception is  sharply opposed to the French
conception: according to this view, ethnocultural unity is constitutive, political unity expressive, of
nationhood
18
.
18  Hence, the temporal distance between the state formation and nation-building processes,
as well  as their sequence, gave shape to the different conceptions of nationhood and
citizenship in France and Germany
19
.  Since French nationalism appeared at about the
same  time  as  the  French  nation-state,  political  and  social  unity  was  the  work  of
statesmen. German nationalism preceded by half a century the formation of the German
nation-state. The German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a
national state. Such a temporal distance made ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of
German nationalism. This paved the way to the significance laid on blood ties and/or
descent as the basis of modern German citizenship.
19  The distinction between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualizations of
citizenship is significant in understanding Turkish nationalism in two aspects : First of all,
Turkish nationalism displays the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms
-  it  embraces  both Civilization and Culture.  Hence it  has  a  paradoxical  nature
20
.  The
paradox  between  Civilization  and  Culture  is  nowhere  better  expressed  than  in  the
writings  of  Ziya  Gökalp.  The  type  of  nationalism that  Ziya  Gökalp  mentioned in  his
writings was individualist and cosmopolitan, yet it also espoused the retainment of a
local,  pristine  identity.  Thus,  the  concepts  of  Civilization  and  Culture  were  not
antithetical,  mutually  exclusive  entities  in  Ziya  Gökalp's  thought. Rather  he  tried  to
synthesize them. Niyazi Berkes in his analysis of Ziya Gökalp's thought maintains that :
20 If his analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts (Culture and Civilization) do not
represent  antithetical  and  mutually  exclusive  entities,  but  rather  two  closely  related  and
complementary traits of social reality...Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in the life
of men only when they enter into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes
merely a matter of mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people and never
gives fruit of any kind
21
.
21  Secondly, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and
nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case, it is possible to refer to a nation preceding
a state (i.e. "a nation in search of its state"), in the Turkish context, the historical order of
things was reversed. In the case of modern Republican Turkey, one can refer to a state
preceding a nation (i.e. "a state in search of its nation")
22
.  Hence, state-political unity
appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkish nation-state. In short, the indivisibility of
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the Turkish state with its nation, and the irreversibility of the borders -contrary to the
case in Germany- constitutes the cornerstone of Turkish national identity. Hence, Turkish
citizenship  appears  as  a  notion  defined  from  above  by  the  state  authorities.  The
distinguishing features of this notion of citizenship were delineated in the 1931 Congress
of the Republican People's Party and were formulated as the "six arrows", which became
the insignia of the Party. These were: Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Republicanism,
Etatism, and Revolutionism. These principles were introduced to the Constitution by 1937
and Turkish citizens were expected to internalize them.
22  There exists another classification of the modern notion of citizenship in the literature.
This classification stems from a philosophical distinction between the liberal or liberal-
individualist traditions and the classical or civic-republican tradition. Adrian Oldfield,
who classifies modern citizenship on the basis of these philosophical traditions, refers to
the differences between citizenship as  "status" and citizenship as "practice"
23
. Liberal-
individualism  has  been  the  dominant  strain  of  thought  in  Anglo-American  political
theory since seventeenth century, roughly from Hobbes onwards. According to Oldfield,
liberal individualism accords the individual an ontological,  epistemological and moral
priority
24
. Liberal individualism defines citizenship as a status on the basis of "rights", and
hence gives rise to a language of citizenship in terms of needs and entitlements. "The
status of citizenship" imposes no "duties" the individuals beyond the minimally civic
ones. Individuals relate to each other on a contractual basis. Any other form of public
involvement and political  activity is their "choice".  Hence,  in the liberal-individualist
tradition, the conception of citizenship generates no social bond other than contract. It
does not prompt any type of social solidarity, cohesion, or sense of common purpose
25
. It
produces an individual who is deficient and impoverished as a social being.
23 The classical or the civic-republican tradition has its origins in the ethical and political
thought of Aristotle. It was reinforced and modified by a succession of political thinkers
from Macchiavelli to Rousseau and beyond. In the words of Oldfield, "it addresses much
more cogently the twin themes of citizenship and community"
26
. In the classical tradition,
citizenship appears as an activity or a practice such that not to engage in the practice is,
in important senses, not to be a citizen
27
. Citizenship, in this tradition, is expressed in
terms of a language of duties and/or obligations to the community. Practices empower
individuals to act like citizens. It is the shared commitment to these practices what makes
individuals  citizens.  It  is  action  in  such  spheres  as  military  service,  which  is  both
constitutive of citizenship and sustaining of the community of which the citizen is a
member.  In  this  view,  individuals  are  not  thought  of  as  logically  prior  to  society
28
.
Moreover, they have no moral priority. As a result, claims may be made on their time,
resources, and lives for the morally superior entity which is the community
29
. Oldfield's
major endeavor is to achieve an articulation between these two different traditions and
redefine the notion of modern citizenship by drawing the good aspects of each. As he puts
it:
24 In the Western world, the ideal of citizenship as status is one which it is not difficult to think
of as achievable, even if vigilance is required to ensure that the achievement is sustained.
Our confidence here is in large part a product of the sheer amount of thought and struggle
which have been invested in the ideal. The same cannot be said of the ideal of citizenship as
practice,  and  in  large  part  this  reflects  the  very  success  of  the  liberal-individualist
achievement,  which was  to  liberate  the  individual  from the  constricting  influences  of
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society and the state. The thinking has been there, but the struggle has not. The question,
therefore, is whether the struggle is worthwhile. We must not expect to displace the idea of
citizenship as status, but we can use elements of this conception to further the project of
citizenship as practice
30
.
25 In the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic the Turkish notion of citizenship
evolved in a manner that is more akin to the civic-republican tradition. Accordingly,
Turkish citizenship is based more on "duties" than on "rights". In a study surveying the
books  utilized  in  citizenship  education courses  in  primary  and secondary  schools  in
Turkey  in  the  Republican  era,  Füsun  Üstel  underlines  the  evolution  of  a  notion  of
citizenship  based  on  duties
31
.  Accordingly,  the  most  important  aim  of  citizenship
education is the achievement of civilization and the inculcation of patriotism. Üstel refers
to a "militant" citizen who evolved until the end of the 1940s, and who was "burdened
with duties"
32
.
26  Fuat Keyman presents a notion of Republican citizenship that is constituted of duties on
the basis (in order to promote a "common good"), to the detriment of individual rights
33
.
He interprets the concept of citizenship in Turkey within the framework of the Platonic
nature of the Kemalist project of modernity. Accordingly, "common good" is defined by
reference to a "will to civilization" on the part of the state elites. Hence, politics in this
context does not entail an articulation of different demands into the decision-making
process, and, therefore, their representation, but rather the steering of society towards a
common good defined by the state elite in accordance with their will to civilization. This
common good has ontological  priority over demands coming from the society
34
.  As a
result, the citizen appears both as the object of the Kemalist modernization project and
its carrier. She is not only expected to internalize this project but also reproduces the
sovereign dominant of the state
35
.
27  Bryan Turner forwards a classification of the modern notion of citizenship based on the
two axes of active versus passive, and the extent of its definition within the public realm
36
. Turner's analysis contains a critique of Marshall's evolutionary and uniform trajectory
of modern citizenship. As he puts it:
28 The point of this historical sketch has been partly to provide a critique of the monolithic and unified
conception of citizenship in Marshall and partly to offer a sociological model of citizenship along two
axes, namely public and private definitions of moral activity in terms of the creation of a public space
of political activity, and active and passive forms of whether the citizen is conceptualized as merely a
subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent
37
.
29 According to Turner's classification, there exist four types of modern citizenship, which
have evolved in four different contexts. First of all, in revolutionary contexts, citizenship
involves a struggle from below (active citizenship) with an emphasis on the public arena
(citizenship evolved in the public realm). As a result, the private world of the individual is
regarded with suspicion. Second, in the liberal pluralist context, citizenships, once again
involves  a  struggle  for  rights  from below (active citizenship),  yet  there also exists  a
continuous emphasis on the rights of the individual for privatized dissent (citizenship
evolved in the private realm). Third, in passive democratic mediums, citizenship rights
are given from above without, or prior to, a struggle from below (passive citizenship or
citizen as subject), combined with a legitimacy of representative institutions, courts and
the welfare state system (citizenship evolved in the public realm). Fourth, in plebscitary
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authoritarian  mediums,  citizenship  rights  are  once  again  given  from above  (passive
citizenship). Yet, although the state invites the citizens to periodically elect a leader, the
latter is no longer responsible to the electorate on a daily basis, and therefore private life
emerges as a "sanctuary from state regulation" (citizenship evolved in the private realm)
38
.
30 Turner refers to the French conception of citizenship within the revolutionary tradition,
where  there  existed  an  attack  on  the  private  space  of  the  family  and  religion.  The
American conception of citizenship contained motifs of the liberal pluralist solution since
participation was emphasized yet contained by a continuous emphasis on the privacy and
the  sacredness  of  individual  opinion.  Tne  English  case  was,  under  the  seventeenth
century settlement, in Turner's opinion, an example of the passive democratic solution,
since citizens appeared as mere subject combined with a legitimacy of the representative
institutions. German fascism constitutes a degeneration of plebscitary democracy, where
"the  individual  citizen  is  submerged  in  the  sacredness  of  the  state,  which  permits
minimal participation in terms of election of leaders, while family life is given priority in
the arena of personal ethical development"
39
. The failure of a radical bourgeois revolution
in Germany in the 1840s, and the realization of unification from above in 1870 by means
of Bismarckian legislation, paved the way to passive citizenship which became the main
carrier  of  social  rights.  The  absence  of  a  successful  liberal  revolution  produced  an
underdeveloped public realm in Germany
40
.
31 The Turkish conception of modern citizenship, when viewed from the angle of Turner's
classification, seems akin both to the revolutionary French tradition - since there exists
an attack on the private  space of  the family  and religion -  and the German passive
tradition. In Turner's formulation, the former tradition may collapse into totalitarianism
when the "state in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme closes off the private sphere
from influencing the course of political affairs"
41
. The Turkish conception differs from the
French one in that it was defined from above and therefore was passive. It is similar to
the German conception in that the absence of a successful liberal revolution - and hence
participation  -  produced  an  underdeveloped  public  realm.  Turkish  citizenship  was
defined  from  above  (passive),  within  an  exaggerated  public  space  smothered  the
individual and invade the private space of the family and religion.  Üstel  observes an
effort to supervise and regulate the private realm in citizenship education for example in
the listing of appropriate fun and recreational activities, the regulation of health and
hygiene, as well as dress codes, until the end of the 1940s
42
.
32 Perhaps what distinguishes the Turkish notion of citizenship from the French tradition is
the absence of  Enlightenment  prior  to  the establishment  of  citizenship.  If,  following
Immanuel Kant, Enlightenment is defined as "man's emergence from his self-incurred
immaturity",  then we might  say that  the Turkish notion of  citizenship precludes  an
unenlightened,  immature  individual
43
.  Hence,  the  notion  of  Turkish  citizenship  was
constructed  on  the  basis  of  an  enlightened,  "free"  individual  capable  of  producing
demands. Such a notion purports to steer the common lives of immature beings by means
of duties. The citizens are not expected to reason. Rather, they are expected to follow. In
elaborating on national morals, Atatürk says :
33 In a nation which is developed and has reached a perfect level, the requirements of national morals
are undertaken by the individuals in that nation -without resorting to reason- by means of the voice of
their conscience and emotional instinct
44
.
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34 Writing in 1929-30, Atatürk acknowledged the immature state of the Republic and argued
that what is usually relegated to individual initiative in developed countries should be
considered as vital state undertakings in the country. As he put it :
35 Our Republic is very young; it is not yet capable of contemporary undertakings and all the grand tasks
that it inherited from the past. As in political and intellectual life, in economic undertakings too, it
would not be correct to wait for the results of individual initiatives. The significant and grand tasks
should be realized in a successful way only by a government that relies on national wealth and
organizes the dispensing and bearing of national sovereignty by relying on all the institutions and
power of the state
45
.
36  Ironically, the state elite's will to civilization hardly received any fundamental criticisms
from the liberal opposition in Turkey in the 1930s. The priority of will over reason is also
evident in some of the liberal texts of that era. In what follows, I will fortify this argument
by briefly focusing on the liberalism and peculiar individualism of Ahmet Agaoglu
46
.
37 Ahmet Agaoglu (1869-1939) is one of the most interesting thinkers of the early Republican
era. He was actively involved in the formation of a legitimate opposition party, the Free
Republican Party (Serbest Firka) in 1930, which lasted less than four months. The Free
Republican  Party  was  founded  upon  the  wishes  of  Atatürk  who  wanted  to  create  a
controlled opposition. In his memoirs, Agaoglu describes how he was given the task of
being among the founders of such a party
47
. The Free Republican Party's political impact
remained quite limited but the impact of the whole experience on Agaoglu's thought was
quite  significant.  He never  returned to  the  ranks  of  the  Republican People's  Party  (
Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi) after this episode. He spent his final years producing a fascinating
literature in terms of a peculiar brand of liberalism.
38  In  his  search  for  the  causes  of  the  backwardness  of  Ottoman  society,  Agaoglu  laid
primary emphasis on the lack of individualism in the Ottoman culture. He thought that in
the East, in general, individuals were not given the opportunity to live. Rather, they were
drowned under despotic regimes :
39 In the East, the individual was drowned, in the West he had unclosed himself; the individual was
squeezed, weakened, and made into a meager being under an increasingly ferocious despotism and put
into his own narrow and constricted sheath. In the West, on the other hand, the individual gradually
took a hold of his freedoms and, by constantly opening up, felt the pleasure of living and working as a
result  of  the weakening of  despotism. As a result,  the Oriental  societies composed of  constricted
individuals put into their own sheath also became constricted and weakened
48
.
40 Agaoglu thought that the lack of basic freedoms in Oriental cultures was the immediate
cause of the backwardness of the Orient.
41 Agaoglu envisioned a type of individualism that would open up Eastern societies to a
vision  of  freedom.  This  individual  was  quite  different  from  the  egoistic  individual
described in classical  liberal  texts.  Agaoglu described this  liberalism in his  book Ben
Neyim? (Who am I?), which was originally published in 1936, three years before he died
49
.
In this book, Agaoglu pointed to a distinction between egoism and altruism, and while he
detested the former, he advocated the latter. The egoist individual, according to him,
typically existed in the Orient. Such an individual did not care about the good of others.
They were, in other words, put into their own sheath.
42  Agaoglu listed three reasons for the emergence of such selfish individuals in the Orient.
The first one related to the family structure and the position of women within the family
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in Eastern societies; the second concerned the educational system and the poor state of
the  existing  literature;  and  the  third  was  grounded  in  the  existence  of  long-lasting
despotic regimes in the East
50
. He argued that, since the family structures separated the
male's  and  female  spaces,  there  was  no  solidarity  between them.  This  consequently
nurtured egoism
51
. Moreover, he also blamed the literary figures for being alienated from
the society and for not providing the society with role models
52
.  Hence, the Ottoman-
Turkish soil was not a fertile ground for the blossoming of virtues such as altruism or
selflessness. In placing his hopes in an altruist, selfless individual, rather than a selfish
one, Agaoglu was displaying his longing for a solidarist structure in the society.
43 In Ben Neyim?, Agaoglu portrays a series of fascinating dialogues between his selfish outer
self,  and selfless inner self.  His individualism did not glorify the selfish, egoistic man
represented in the outer self. On the contrary, his individualism carried the traits of the
inner self,  and hence was laden with altruist  and solidarist  motifs.  Hence,  it  may be
referred to as solidarist individualism.
44 Agaoglu did not place too much emphasis on the role of institutions and laws in creating
selfless individuals. In the tradition of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, he laid his hope,
rather, on the adoption of certain moral values since he thought despotic frames of mind
lingered on in the Turkish Republic despite the Kemalist reforms
53
. Such a moral, virtuous
individual was rather to be created by two methods: First of all, Agaoglu placed a lot of
importance  on  the  role  of  the  leading  literary  figures,  such  as  poets,  novelists  and
intellectuals of his time. He considered literary figures and intellectuals to be motors of
progress. Accordingly, he at times voiced a major disillusionment with the works of such
figures in the Ottoman-Turkish lands
54
.  His elitism is nowhere more clearly expressed
than in his utopian novel, Serbest Insanlar Ülkesinde (In the Land of the Free Men).
55
 Here,
he describes the process through which an egoist individual becomes a selfless man. All
along,  he is  guided by a  group of  intellectuals  which he refers  as  the "pir"s.  Hence,
Agaoglu's individualism contains elitist motifs.
45 Secondly, the selfless individuals were to be created by their own internal self. Inner self
was expected to tame the outer self. At this point, Agaoglu's thought was influenced by
the works of Henri Bergson, which had a metaphysical dimension.
56
 The Turkish followers
of  Bergson in their  journal,  Dergah,  argued that,  the secret  of  success  of  the War of
Independence was to do with more than just technical advances in the military. It was not
something that could be measured by the categories of positive sciences. Rather such a
success spilled from a basic instinct of all living creatures which was called élan vital (elan
of life).
46 In a fascinating book, where he described the life and works of his father's friends, Ahmet
Agaoglu's late son, Samet Agaoglu, pointed to a difference between his father's and Ziya
Gökalp's ideas.
57
 He argued that in Ziya Gökalp's thought, the individual had to surrender
to the state entity - hence there were no rights but only duties. Agaoglu, on the other
hand,  brought  the  individual  to  the  forefront,  outside  of  the  realm  of  the  state.
Nevertheless, he still placed more emphasis on duties than on rights. What distinguished
Agaoglu was his vision of an individual who would eventually be aware of his duties
through the efforts of his own inner self. Hence, Agaoglu underlined the significance of
will over reason. Since spirit was made up of both reason and will, reason had to give in to
will for the achievement of a solidarist social structure composed of selfless, responsible
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individuals. Given all his descriptions of duty-oriented, moral, selfless individuals led by "
pir"s, Agaoglu's land of the free man seems rather like a dystopia where moral despotism
reigns. The selfless individuals of this puritan free land seem to have gone through what
he calls the three types of cleanliness cleansing of the body, heart, and spirit
58
.
47 It is obvious that Agaoglu's individualism carried both elitist and solidarist motifs due to
its emphasis on the intellectuals and altruism at the expense of egoism. His individual
was not someone who was expected to use his reason but rather was to be dragged to an
"ordered freedom" under the guidance of intellectual leaders
59
.
48 The main contention of this article is that, in the Turkish context, the concept of modern
citizenship evolved in such a way as to exclude a liberal individualist dimension. Whereas
in Western Europe the notion of the individual appeared in philosophical writings prior
to the emergence of modern citizenship, in Turkey the citizen precedes the individual.
Hence, Turkish citizens found themselves to be absorbed in grand social projects such as
Kemalism, Socialism, and political Islam. Trapped in the missions of such projects, they
were unable to recognize the significance of becoming an individual prior to becoming a
Kemalist, Socialist, and political Islamist. 
49  In Turkey, the civil and legal, political and social rights associated with citizenship were
given from above. They were not acquired as a result of struggles from below.  The notion
of  Turkish  citizenship  evolved  within  the  civic  republican  tradition  by  emphasizing
practices that were viewed as duties. In the early years of the Republic, Turkish citizens
were  geared  towards  embracing  the  fundamental  tenets  of  the  Turkish  revolution,
namely, Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Republicanism, Etatism, and Revolutionism.
The association of such aspects of the Republican ideology with citizenship paved the way
to its definition by disregarding a distinction between the public and the private realms.
The Republican elite defined, not only the public duties of the citizens, but also their
private roles, dress codes, and their recreational activities. It is then possible to argue
that the notion of Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the Republican elite, by
disregarding the privacy of the individuals. In sum, in the founding years of the Republic,
Turkish citizenship was defined from above by a state elite within the civic Republican
tradition,  by  emphasizing  duties  over  rights  and by disregarding  the  privacy  of  the
individual. 
50 Ironically, the Republican epistemology shaped the contours of the liberal arguments in
the  Turkish  context  as  well.  One  of  the  self-acclaimed  liberals  of  the  1930s,  Ahmet
Agaoglu, for instance, formulated an individualism which was delimited by a Republican
epistemology.  This  epistemology  had  two  distinguishing  features:  First  of  all,  it  was
essentialist, i.e. it was based on an essentialist distinction between the East and the West
and/or the Orient and the Occident. Secondly, it was based on a managerial attitude on
the part of the Republican elite who identified civilization as a societal goal, and who
initiated a process of social engineering geared towards constructing a modern national
identity at the expense of traditional,  local,  religious identities
60
.  Agaoglu's liberalism,
defined  within  the  confines  of  a  Republican  epistemology  was  laden  with  positivist,
vanguardist, solidarist, and moralist motifs. The characteristics of Agaoglu's individual,
were quite akin to the Republican citizen who was a militant follower rather than a
reflecting, reasoning being. 
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51 In sum, the Republican citizen expected to "follow" rather than reach certain decisions
via his/her own reflection, was the subject of another will. According to Hans Reiss, who
interpreted Kant's definitive study on Enlightenment :
52 He (Kant)  does  not  consider it  to  be  the  purpose  of  politics  to  make people  happy.
Happiness is subjective...This argument, of course, does not mean that he does not wish
people to be happy. It only means that political arrangements should not be organized in such
a way as to aim at promoting happiness, but that they should permit men to attain happiness in
their own way
61
.
53 Accordingly,  Turkish  citizens  were  discouraged  from  pursuing  their  own  happiness.
Rather, they were integrated into a grand civilizational design which was believed to
promote happiness. The individual defined in some liberal texts was quite delimited and
was not that different from the citizen envisioned by the state elite. Hence, a political
culture that prompted the will  to follow rather than the courage to reason began to
evolve in the Turkish Republic. Will triumphed over reason. Perhaps the most revealing
metaphor pertaining to the triumph of will over reason in Turkey is the place deemed
appropriate for the replica of Auguste Rodin's notorious sculpture, The Thinker, which
represents a naked, reflecting men. The most distinguished Turkish replica of The Thinker
resides in the yard of  a  mental  hospital  in Istanbul,  as  if  signifying a tribute to the
discouragement of a naked moment of reflection (enlightenment tradition) 
54 in Turkey. 
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